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BILSKI ON BIOTECH: THE POTENTIAL FOR LIMITING THE
NEGATIVE IMPACT OF GENE PATENTS
BRYAN NESE*
I. INTRODUCION
While patents may serve as powerful incentives for advancing
scientific and technical progress, they may also act as harmful restric-
tions on society. One field in particular where patents recently seem to
play this latter role is genetics. Here, researchers discovering new in-
formation about genetic diseases and doctors diagnosing these devas-
tating disorders have become infringers, subject to harsh monetary pe-
nalties or restrictive injunctions.' In these cases, a patent system
created to encourage innovation has instead stifled the progress of re-
search and impaired public healthcare. These patents, which have only
relatively recently begun to emerge in this field, are collectively re-
ferred to as gene patents: patents that claim genes themselves, struc-
tures that mimic the function of genes, or methods for diagnosing
conditions based on observing certain genes.2
* Associate, Kenyon & Kenyon, L.L.P., Washington, DC; J.D., The George
Washington University Law School, 2009; M.S., Mechanical Engineering, The
Pennsylvania State University, 2006; B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Rowan Univer-
sity, 2004. The author wishes to thank Professor Sonia Suter of the George Wash-
ington University Law School for her advice, guidance, and encouragement in pre-
paring this article.
1. See Jon Merz & Mildred Cho, What Are Gene Patents and Why Are People
Worried About Them?, 8 COMMuNITY GENETICS 203, 205 (2005) (highlighting ex-
amples of certain genetic testing procedures for which patent holders have de-
manded royalties or threatened to take legal action).
2. Id. at 204-06.
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Many of these patents contain broad claims that have far-reaching
implications, often restricting the activities of researchers and physi-
cians. Consider, for example, a method for detecting Alzheimer's dis-
ease, such as the method claimed in U.S. Patent No. 5,508,167 (the
'167 patent). Claim 1 of this patent recites:
A method of detecting if a subject is at increased risk of developing
late onset Alzheimer's disease (AD) comprising directly or indirect-
ly:
detecting the presence or absence of an apolipoprotein E type 4 iso-
form (ApoE4) in the subject; and
observing whether or not the subject is at increased risk of develop-
ing late onset AD by observing if the presence of ApoE4 is or is not
detected, wherein the presence of ApoE4 indicates said subject is at
increased risk of developing late onset AD.3
The "invention" in this case essentially consists of two steps: (1)
searching for the presence of a particular gene (ApoE4); and (2) de-
termining that a subject is at an increased risk for a particular condi-
tion (Alzheimer's disease) based on the presence of this gene. Thus,
any person looking for the presence of the ApoE4 gene and making a
determination of whether a subject is at risk for late-onset Alzheimer's
based on the presence of the gene would infringe this patent, regard-
less of the tools or specific methodology used. The holder of such pa-
tents could therefore demand royalties from anyone who performed
these steps or, worse still, ban the performing of the steps altogether.
Hospitals could not test for this condition, and scientists could not
conduct certain research, without falling under the scope of these
broad claims. As will be shown, these patents place serious, harmful
restrictions on society while giving little new, useful, and nonobvious
information in return. As such, gene patents work against the purpose
of granting exclusive rights as stated by the Constitution.4 They are a
burden on, not a benefit to, society. And some limitation on gene pa-
tents (or at least those that are most harmful) is necessary.
3. U.S. Patent No. 5,508,167, at claim 1 (filed Apr. 13, 1994). The patent lists
Duke University as the assignee. Id. at [73].
4. See infra Part II.A. (detailing that the constitutional power to grant patents
arises from a desire to encourage innovation).
[Vol. 46
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Accordingly, the aim of this article is threefold: to remind readers
of the purpose of patent law as set forth in the Constitution, to high-
light a particular class of patents that works against that purpose, and
to propose a potential limitation, rooted in recent case law, on the
harmful effects of these patents. In doing so, this article first briefly
considers the constitutional clause that provides Congress with the
power to grant patents, while also suggesting the importance of a go-
vernmental power to grant exclusive rights and the need for limita-
tions on this power. Next, this article defines what is meant by "gene
patent," provides examples of three main types of gene patents, and
briefly reviews gene patents' origins in late-twentieth century case
law. Having defined gene patents, this article then presents evidence
of their harmful impact on society as "hold-ups" and "toll booths" to
research and health care.5 Next, this article reviews some previously
suggested solutions to the gene patent problem before offering a novel
solution in light of the recent In re Bilski6 case, which may serve as a
strong limitation on one particularly troubling type of gene patent. By
reminding the reader why patents exist, highlighting a category of pa-
tents that harms society, and offering a solution to that harm, this ar-
ticle attempts to ensure that patents more effectively achieve their in-
tended goal of encouraging innovation.
5. See infra Part IV.A.-C. (discussing gene patents' negative impact on re-
search and public health).
6. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), petition for cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). Note that, as of this writing, the United States Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari in this case, with oral argument heard on Novem-
ber 9, 2009. The decision is pending. Although it is unclear at this point what action
the Supreme Court will take in this case, recent appeals to the Supreme Court from
the Federal Circuit have each resulted in reversals. See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Biz-
corn Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom; Quanta Computer
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008); KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc., 119 Fed.
App'x. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Thus, the actual effect of
Bilski may change depending on the Supreme Court's decision. This article de-
scribes a solution to the gene patent problem under the current state of the law, how-
ever.
139
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PATENT POWER
The United States patent system exists to stimulate the progress of
the "useful arts." 7 Accordingly, before describing gene patents and
their impact on society, it is first necessary to briefly review the con-
stitutional provision providing Congress the authority to issue patents.
An examination of the language and history of this provision reveals
the Framers' intention that patents serve to encourage innovation. 8
The following section then goes on to describe the importance of ex-
clusive rights and the need for limitations on granting them.
A. The Purpose of the United States Patent System: To Promote the
Progress of Useful Arts
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the concept that the
government could advance scientific and cultural progress by creating
incentives for would-be inventors became widespread. 9 In early
America-amidst the spreading influence of the Enlightenment-
Benjamin Franklin played a key role in endorsing this concept.10 The
preambles of many state intellectual property statutes at the time
echoed this sentiment, containing language that recognized the social
utility and public benefit of encouraging innovation.al In addition, the
Framers were all too familiar with the harms of overly-broad monopo-
lies and were hesitant to give the new central government an un-
checked authority to grant exclusive rights. 12
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See id. ("Congress shall have power.., to promote the progress of ... use-
ful arts").
9. Frank Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent
Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309, 316 (1961).
10. JOHN BURY, THE IDEA OFPROGRESS 176 (Dover ed., 1955).
11. Prager, supra note 9, at 317.
12. George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 6, 7- 8 (1936). In fact, Thomas Jefferson (often mistakenly labeled as the fa-
ther of American patent law) vehemently opposed monopolies of any kind, includ-
ing those for patents. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July
1788) in 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45, 47(Washington ed. 1814) (detailing
Jefferson's feelings that even the benefits of limited monopolies for the purpose of
inciting ingenuity are "too doubtful" to warrant their existence).
[Vol. 46
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The Framers likely had these ideas in mind when drafting the
Constitution in 1787. These influences are apparent in the Patent
Clause, found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The Patent Clause is unique among the eighteen enumerated
powers of Congress in that it is the only power to have a conditional
grant. 13 Accordingly, Congress may "secure" exclusive rights to in-
ventors for limited times, but only in order "to promote the progress
of... useful arts." 14 Thus, there is a limitation on the power of the
federal government to grant exclusive rights; and it carries with it an
important practical effect: a check on abuse of the patent right. Con-
gress does not have the authority to issue patents to reward a particular
industry or to bestow favor upon political supporters; it may only
grant patents for the purpose of encouraging innovation.
In an effort to guarantee the patent system serves this function,
Congress has placed various restrictions on patentability that tend to
ensure that patents promote the country's technological progress. For
example, § 102 of the Patent Statute ensures that patents issue only for
"new" inventions,15 as the offering of exclusive rights for an already
known product or process does not promote progress. Similarly, § 103
bars the patenting of inventions that are mere obvious combinations of
known subject matter, 16 as the reward of patent rights for the mere
combination of articles already in the public domain also fails to fur-
ther the progress of innovation.
13. EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS
34 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. eds., 1998).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Although other means of encouraging innova-
tion were almost surely known to the drafters of the Constitution (most relating to
monetary awards of some kind), the decision to promote the progress of creativity
and invention through exclusive grants most likely arose out of the financial plight
of the newly created federal government. Plagued by debts after the Revolutionary
War, the infant federal government likely could not afford to promote innovation
through monetary or land grants. DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 28-29 (West 2005) (1990).
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (reciting, inter alia, various statutory bars to
patentability based on prior disclosures).
16. Id. § 103.
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B. The Importance of Exclusive Rights
An effective patent system provides several benefits to society.
For example, each patent may be thought of as a social contract be-
tween the inventor and the general public. In return for the inventor's
right to exclude, the public receives full disclosure of the invention,
ensuring that any person having ordinary skill in the field can make or
use the invention upon expiration of the patent term.1 7 In this way, a
patent acts as a blueprint for those in the field to which the patent re-
lates, enabling anyone having ordinary skill in the field to make and
use the invention. This allows the public to eventually enjoy the full
benefit of the invention. After the period of exclusive rights ends, the
invention falls into the public domain, and all are free to make and use
it.1 8 To ensure that the public receives this knowledge, the Patent Sta-
tute contains strict provisions mandating that the patent thoroughly
describes what the invention is, how it is made, and how it may be
used. 19
Because much of the progress of research and development de-
pends on a broad, publicly-available knowledge base, it is important to
create incentives for researchers and inventors to contribute to this
collective knowledge. Society typically benefits from disclosure rather
than secrecy, so an additional goal for an ideal patent system should
be to create an incentive for full disclosure of inventions. Perhaps in
furtherance of this goal, all patents (and many patent applications) in
the United States are made publicly available.2 0 As all patents must sa-
17. See id. § 112 (requiring that the patent contain a written description that
would enable one of ordinary skill in the field to make and use the invention).
18. See id. § 271(a) (stating that whoever makes, uses, or sells a patented in-
vention is liable for infringement "during the term of the patent").
19. Id. This requirement, codified in § 112 of the Patent Statute, is known as
the "enabling disclosure" requirement. Some have even suggested that the disclosure
requirement is so important that the provisions of § 112 alone are sufficient to satis-
fy the condition that all patents promote the progress of useful arts. Edward Walter-
scheid, Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 297-
300 (2002).
20. In fact, patents and published applications have never been more easily ac-
cessible to the general public. The age of the internet has made it possible to read,
search, and amass patents in ways never before possible. The governments of many
countries make their patents available for free online, often with full-text search ca-
pabilities. See, e.g., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Homepage,
142 [Vol. 46
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tisfy § 112's enabling disclosure requirement, the United States Patent
Office has essentially created a massive catalog of previously discov-
ered knowledge available to anyone willing to wade through the
overwhelming amount of material. This free, readily-available know-
ledge can serve as a springboard for further research in a nearly limit-
less array of fields. Thus, § 112 confers an additional benefit on socie-
ty: ensuring that inventors pool their findings in a central location,
allowing others after them to improve and to build upon their previous
work. 21
C. The Importance of Limitations on Exclusive Rights
Although an efficient patent system offers numerous benefits for a
society, the unchecked granting of exclusive rights for frivolous or al-
ready-known devices may likely lead to more harm than good. In or-
der to prevent devious patent holders from removing knowledge al-
ready in the public domain or from extending the term of a patent
indefinitely, some restrictions on patent grants are clearly necessary.
The Framers surely realized this. In fact, shortly after the Constitution
was adopted, the first Congress set to work on drafting the first patent
act in 1790, which contained various requirements for patentability.
22
Among these requirements were the familiar concepts of novelty,
utility, and the written description requirement. 23 Thomas Jefferson,
one of the three original patent examiners, also unilaterally chose not
to grant patents for devices that he felt to be frivolous or merely ob-
http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (providing publicly-available,
full-text searches of issued patents and published patent applications). In addition,
private corporations have even begun creating free, searchable patent databases on
the world wide web, with Google, Inc. being among the most notable. Google Pa-
tents Homepage, http://www.google.com/patents (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
21. One author also noted that multiple researchers or inventors simultaneous-
ly devoting time and efforts to the same invention is a waste of resources. Laurie
Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 238 (2003).
Although the current patent system does not guarantee that such waste will not occur
(patent applications are not made publicly available until eighteen months after fil-
ing), the ease by which a patent or published application may be obtained certainly
helps to alert those in the field of what has already been discovered.
22. Kenneth Burchfeil, Revising the Original Patent Clause, 2 HARV. J.L.
TECH. 155, 182 (1989).
23. Id.
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vious improvements of old, known devices. 24 These limitations remain
an important part of the Patent Statute and case law today. They serve
as a check on the patent system, attempting to protect the public from
frivolous patents that do not either advance technology or encourage
inventors to design new products.25 One must be careful to remember
that patents are, in a sense, monopolies 26 that restrict the public's use
of potentially beneficial products or methods. During the patent's
term, no one may make, use, or sell what is claimed in the patent
without the permission of the patent holder.27 Thus, during this term
each patent removes something from the public domain, albeit provid-
ing useful knowledge in return. As a matter of policy, the desire to
promote the progress of useful arts must outweigh this burden on the
public.
Furthermore, there is a notion that science will progress more ra-
pidly in an environment where information and new discoveries are
free-flowing and shared among the community.28 Patents may inhibit
this notion by restricting scientists' ability to use this information. For
example, a patent on a revolutionary cancer drug would potentially
prevent others from studying or conducting clinical trials on the drug
without the permission of the owner of the patent rights, as the patent
24. DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 283 (1951).
25. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) ("Only inventions and
discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified
the special inducement of a limited private monopoly. Jefferson did not believe in
granting patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices. His
writings evidence his insistence upon a high level of patentability.").
26. A subtle point is worth noting here. Although patents resemble monopolies
in some ways, the term is not a perfect description by any means. The word mono-
poly carries the connotation that patents convey some positive right on the inventor
to use and practice the invention. This is not the case. Patents provide the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) (2008). They do not give the inventor an absolute right to use the invention
if, for example, another patent or other law prevents her from doing so. Merz, supra
note 1, at 204 ("A patent does not grant its owner the positive right to use an inven-
tion").
27. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2008).
28. Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1017, 1017 (1989).
[Vol. 46
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 46 [2009], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol46/iss1/4
2009] LIMITING THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF GENE PATENTS 145
prevents others from making or using the patented invention. In this
way, certain patents may sometimes impede downstream research. 9
With these concerns in mind, the Patent Statute provides that, in
order to receive a patent, an invention must be directed to patentable
subject matter 3° that is new,3' useful,32 and nonobvious. 33 Inventions
that meet these requirements (at least in theory) contribute something
of value to the public that makes the burden of exclusive rights
worthwhile. In addition to these four "substantive" requirements, the
patent application itself must contain a clear enabling disclosure and
set forth the best mode for carrying out the invention.
34
III. BACKGROUND ON GENE PATENTS
Having discussed the constitutional authority for the United States
patent system, the importance of exclusive rights, and the need for li-
mitations on exclusive rights, this article now turns to gene patents
themselves: a group of patents whose benefit to society is often sub-
stantially outweighed by the burden their exclusive rights impose. Af-
ter generally defining gene patents, this section describes three basic
classifications. Examples of each of these classifications are given,
and analyses of the harmful implications of each are provided. Finally,
this section concludes with a discussion of the recent rush of gene pa-
tent applications, highlighting the severity of the gene patent problem.
29. This concern is explored in greater detail in Part IV.C., infra. Although
this seems inconsistent with the notion that patents encourage disclosure and there-
fore aid downstream research, this apparent discrepancy is easily resolved. While
overly-broad patents may restrict some activities of downstream researchers during
the patent term, the knowledge derived from the patents themselves may be used
without restriction after the expiration of the term. Furthermore, even during the
term, the restrictions placed on society by the patent may even encourage a clever
inventor to design around the claimed invention to arrive at a new, better (and non-
infringing) alternative.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
31. Id. §§ 101-02.
32. Id. § 101.
33. Id. § 103.
34. Id. § 112.
9
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A. Defining Gene Patents
Before discussing how gene patents often fail to promote the
progress of useful arts, we must first describe what is meant by "gene
patent." Generally, the term "gene patent" refers to a wide variety of
patents relating to methods of testing for genetic conditions, various
markers or probes using particular genes, or even the genes them-
selves. 35 Professor Jon Merz of the University of Pennsylvania School
of Medicine suggests that gene patents consist of three broad catego-
ries: (1) diagnostic gene patents, (2) composition of matter gene pa-
tents, and (3) functional use gene patents. 36
1. Diagnostic Gene Patents
The first of Professor Merz's classifications of gene patents-
diagnostic gene patents--covers various genetic tests. 37 Because these
patents typically claim methods that diagnose a particular genetic dis-
ease or condition, Professor Merz sometimes refers to these as "dis-
ease gene patents." 38 These methods essentially claim the process of
observing a particular portion of a patient's genetic sequence in search
of a sequence known to cause a particular disease. 39 Usually, the me-
thods of these patents compare a patient's gene to a known gene, or a
mutation of that gene, that indicates a particular condition. The patents
in this class usually consist of process patent claims.4n
35. Merz, supra note 1, at 204.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jon Merz, Disease Gene Patents: Overcoming Unethical Constraints on
Clinical Laboratory Medicine, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 324, 324 (1999).
39. Id.
40. Also referred to as "method" claims, process claims (one of the four
"classes" of statutory subject matter under § 101) describe an invention comprising a
series of steps rather than a specific product or physical item. See Merz, supra note
1, at 204. However, structural language can be included in process claims as well (in
order to describe an apparatus for accomplishing a certain task, for example). Id.
Examples of process claims include methods for making various products, methods
for using products in novel, nonobvious ways, or various surgical techniques. Id.
146 [Vol. 46
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U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (the '441 patent), directed to "170-
linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene," serves as an ex-
ample.41 This patent claims, inter alia:
[A] method for screening.. . a human subject for an alteration of a
BRCA1 gene which comprises comparing a BRCA1 gene ... with
germline sequences of wild-type BRCA1 gene ... wherein a differ-
ence in the sequence of the BRCA1 gene.., of the subject from
wild-type indicates an alteration in the BRCA1 gene in said sub-
ject.4 2
This patent, having broad claims typical of many diagnostic gene
patents, claims all methods of comparing a copy of the BRCA1 gene
43
in a human subject with a BRCA1 gene from a control group.44 A dif-
ference between the control group gene (the "wild-type" gene) from
the corresponding gene in the human subject indicates a mutation in
the BRCA1 gene.45 Although the patent does not claim the BRCA1
gene itself, its claims do cover all methods of comparing a wild type
gene with a patient's gene to determine a difference.46 The claim does
not specify any specific steps to compare the genes, nor does it recite
any structural limitations or otherwise link the method to any particu-
lar instrumentation or equipment.47 Under this sweeping language, all
methods of comparing the genes would infringe the '441 patent, re-
gardless of the specific examples described in the patent's specifica-
tion.
41. U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed on Jan. 5, 1996). The patent is assigned to
Myriad Genetics, Inc., the University of Utah Research Foundation, and the United
States, as represented by the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. at [73].
42. Id. at claim 1.
43. The BRCAI gene is thought to be a cause for certain forms of breast can-
cer. Lori Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property
Rights, 3 NATURE REVS.: GENETICs 803, 804 (2002).
44. '441 Patent at claim 1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
11
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2. Composition-of-Matter Gene Patents
Composition-of-matter gene patents, unlike diagnostic gene pa-
tents, cover physical compositions, such as genes themselves. 48 Pro-
fessor Merz defines this category as encompassing various chemicals
and materials, "including the isolated and purified gene (cDNA) and
all derivative products (e.g., recombinant proteins or drugs, viral vec-
tors and gene transfer 'therapies', transfected cells, cell lines and
higher order animal models in which the patented gene has been in-
serted or knocked Out)." 49 Professor Merz also notes that the various
proteins or other therapeutic products formed through specific,
claimed processes fall into this category. 50 Such claims are known as
"product-by-process" claims.5 1 This class generally consists of "prod-
uct" claims-claims directed towards a physical thing rather than a
method.52
An example of a composition-of-matter gene patent is U.S. Patent
No. 4,703,008 (the '008 patent), directed to "DNA sequences encod-
ing erythropoietin." 53 This patent claims, inter alia, a "purified and
isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence en-
coding human [or monkey] erythropoietin." 54 This claim covers all
48. Merz, supra note 1, at 205.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. A product-by-process claim is "a product claim that defines the claimed
product in terms of the process by which it is made." U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
2173.05(p) (8th ed., 7th rev. (2008)) [hereinafter MPEP].
52. A second broad classification for patentable subject matter is referred to as
"product" claims. Id. § 2106(IV)(A). Product claims include the remaining three
categories of patentable subject matter recited in § 101 (machine, manufacture, and
composition of matter). Id.
53. U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (filed Nov. 30, 1984). The patent is assigned to
Kiren-Amgen, Inc. Id. at [73].
54. Id. at claims 2, 3. The "isolated and purified" language seems to be typical
in many composition-of-matter gene patents. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,284,522 at
claim I (filed Oct. 23, 1995). Presumably, claim drafters include these types of limi-
tations in an effort to ensure that the subject matter of the claim is patentable. While
products of nature (such as the human genome, which is comprised of the entire ge-
netic code) are unpatentable, an isolated or purified piece of a product of nature
(which does not occur naturally) is patentable. Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit
provides an example of this concept: While out hiking in the woods, a hiker discov-
[Vol. 46
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genes that code for erythropoietin (EPO), including mutated ver-
sions.55 Thus, the patent holder had the right to exclude anyone else
from making EPO (by any means, whether known to the inventor at
the time or not) or using the isolated EPO gene. Also, the patent
claims host cells "transformed or transfected" with the sequences of
claims 2 and 3.56
This patent, typical of composition-of-matter gene patents, claims
the gene itself. Such claims have far-reaching implications. Not only
do these patents prevent others from using genes that fall under the
scope of the claims, but they also bar others from extracting or isolat-
ing these genes from the genome by any means. Thus, researchers that
wish to use an isolated gene that falls under the claims of a composi-
tion-of-matter gene patent would be unable to do so without permis-
sion from the patent holder. In addition, the very process of isolating
this gene by any means would infringe such a patent. For these rea-
sons, composition-of-matter gene patents are particularly troubling.
3. Functional- Use Gene Patents
An "emerging class of gene patents," according to Professor
Merz, "is that which claims the functional use of a gene. These patents
are based on discovery of the role genes play in disease or other bodi-
ly and cellular functions or pathways, and claim methods and compo-
sitions of matter... used to up- or down-regulate the gene." 57 Essen-
tially, these patents claim products or methods that achieve a
particular result or serve a particular function, such as the manipula-
ers a previously undiscovered type of grass that, when rubbed on the feet, cures ath-
lete's foot; although the hiker cannot patent the grass itself (as she merely discov-
ered, and did not invent, the grass), she can patent the isolated active ingredient that
causes the cure. Judge Randall Rader, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, Lecture in the Patent Law Course at the George Washington
University Law School (Fall 2007). Erythropoietin (EPO) is a "protein consisting of
165 amino acids which stimulates the production of red blood cells." Amgen Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991). EPO is useful in the
treatment of blood disorders in which the body fails to produce an adequate number
of red blood cells. Id.
55. '008 Patent at claims 2, 3.
56. Id. at claim 23.
57. Merz, supra note 1, at 206.
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tion of the function of a target gene.5 8 Accordingly, this class would
include product, process, and, presumably, product-by-process claims.
U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (the '516 patent), 59 directed to "nuclear
factors associated with transcriptional regulation," provides a good
example of a functional-use gene patent.60 Claim 1 of the '516 patent
recites "[a] method for inhibiting expression ... of a gene whose tran-
scription is regulated by NF-KB, the method comprising reducing NF-
KB activity in the cell such that expression of said gene is inhi-
bited. '61
Like the '516 patent, functional-use patents claim processes and
products that mimic the function of certain genes. 62 Often, these pa-
tents do not cover the genes themselves but do claim all drugs or other
chemicals that fulfill the same bodily or cellular function as a particu-
lar gene.63 As in diagnostic and composition-of-matter gene patents,
functional-use gene patents often cover a broad range of subject mat-
ter. Claims in these types of patents can encompass all products or
processes that replicate the known function of a particular gene, in-
cluding drugs, therapies, and other treatments not contemplated by the
inventor at the time the application was filed.
64
58. Id.
59. This patent, owned by Ariad Pharmacueticals, was recently the subject of
an infringement suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2007).
After a fourteen-day trial, the '516 patent survived Eli's invalidity contentions that
the claims were in violation of the novelty, enablement, and written description re-
quirements. Id. at 112. On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit reversed in part,
holding that four of the claims in dispute (claims 80, 95, 144, and 145) violated the
written description requirement of § 112. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560
F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The court determined that the claims were too
broad and "far beyond" the scope of the patent's specification. Id. at 1377.
60. U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (filed June 5, 1995). This patent alone contains
over 200 claims. Id.
61. Id. at claim 1.
62. Merz, supra note 1, at 206.
63. Id.
64. It is worth noting here that the concept of extending claims to cover sub-
ject matter not considered or expressly described by the inventor does not always
have a negative impact. In fact, the doctrine of equivalents is rooted, at least in part,
on this principle. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S.
605 (1950) (creating a doctrine allowing patent holders to enforce patent rights on
subject matter not explicitly recited in the claims or even the specification). Under
[Vol. 46
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B. The Gene Patent Rush
Having described various types of gene patents and discussed
some possible implications of their claims, this article now discusses
the origins of gene patents and how they have expanded since incep-
tion. Much like the explosive number of filings of patent applications
for business methods spawned by the Federal Circuit's 1998 State
Street Bank decision, 65 the so-called gene patent rush also has its roots
in case law.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
"everything under the sun that is made by man" may be patented, in-
cluding living organisms and genetic material. 66 By 1991, the Federal
Circuit regularly seemed to accept the notion that purified DNA se-
quences constitute patentable subject matter.67 This opened the flood-
gates for gene patents, and beginning in the 1990s, the first patent ap-
the doctrine of equivalents, a party that does not literally meet each and every ele-
ment of a claim can still infringe a patent if elements of the accused device or me-
thod are the equivalent of the claimed elements. Id. at 609. For example, if a hypo-
thetical patent claims an electric guitar having "steel strings," and an accused
product contains all the elements of the claim but uses a steel alloy for its strings, the
accused product can still infringe the patent. This doctrine prevents would-be in-
fringers from avoiding liability simply through making simple design-arounds that
are not expressly disclosed in the patent. This doctrine releases the patent applicant
from the burden of describing every conceivable variant of her invention. However,
the doctrine of equivalents, like much patent case law, developed out of cases in-
volving the mechanical arts. Some scholars argue that these doctrines, many of
which developed before the boom of the biotech industry, are both unworkable and
unsuitable for the chemical or biological arts. See Rebecca Eisenberg, Re-Examining
the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J.
783, 783 ("Is a patent system developed to establish rights in mechanical inventions
of an earlier era up to the task of resolving competing claims to the genome on be-
half of the many sequential innovators who elucidate its sequence and function, with
due regard to the interests of the scientific community and the broader public?"); see
also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (stating
that the majority opinion "links patent eligibility to the age of iron and steel at a time
of subatomic particles and terabytes").
65. Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Pa-
tents, 1971 - 2000, 57 J. OF FN. 901, 901 (2002).
66. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
67. See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that "[a] gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one").
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plications for human genetic material were filed.68 Shortly thereafter,
and not unlike the Gold Rush of the 1800s, there began a race to pa-
tent as much of the isolated portions of the human genome as possi-
ble.69 Much of this "gene patent rush" likely stemmed from the rapidly
evolving capabilities for sequencing and cloning genes. 70
As a result, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
was flooded with applications relating to genes and genetic testing
methods. According to one source, as of 2003, an astounding three
million genome-related patent applications had been filed with the
PTO.71 During this period, the PTO received heavy criticism for grant-
ing patents too liberally. 72 In response, the PTO issued new guidelines
for determining utility, inviting the public to comment on the issue of
gene patents. 73 Ultimately concluding that it was bound by policy and
case law such as Chakrabarty, the PTO rejected arguments that genes
were products of nature and thus unpatentable. 74 The final version of
these guidelines left the door open for gene patents, concluding that a
patent would issue "[a]s long as one specific, substantial and credible
use is disclosed and the statutory requirements are met." 75
68. Debra Greenfield, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital: Unjust
Enrichment and the Patenting of Human Genetic Material, 15 ANN. HEALTH L. 213,
229 (2006).
69. Jonathan Kahn, What's the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting Human
Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 417, 420-21 (2003).
70. Merz, supra note 1, at 204.
71. Kahn, supra note 69, at 420-21 (citing U.S. Dep't of Energy, Human Ge-
nome Project Information: Genetics and Patenting (2001),
http://www.oml.gov/hgmis/elsi/patents.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009)).
72. Id. at 421.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 439.
75. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001).
These guidelines gave the green light for gene patents, despite recognizing that
"[sleveral comments state that patents should not issue for genes because patents on
genes are delaying medical research and thus there is no societal benefit associated
with gene patents" and that "[o]thers state that granting patents on genes at any stage
of research deprives others of incentives and the ability to continue exploratory re-
search and development." Id. The PTO's response to these criticisms was simply
that "incentives to make discoveries and inventions is generally spurred, not inhi-
bited, by patents." Id.
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During this rush, lots of "land-grabbing" occurred without actual-
ly knowing what was being claimed.76 Applicants raced to the patent
office in an effort to be the first to stake a claim to newly discovered
genes, having only the slightest notion of their usefulness or potential.
This, of course, stands contrary to the principle that "a patent is not a
hunting license." 77 Patentability requires that an applicant have some
idea of an invention's utility before filing a patent application. 78 This
land-grabbing trend continues today, and as of 2005 "In]early 30,000
human genes have been patented" in the United States.79 The substan-
tial number of filings of gene patents throughout this rush compounds
the problems highlighted above.
IV. GENE PATENTS' POTENTIAL TO IMPEDE THE
PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS
As noted above, gene patents are both far-reaching and highly
prevalent. This section explores the various ways that gene patents
negatively affect the progress of the useful arts, including their poten-
tial to impede innovation. In addition, this section discusses gene pa-
tents' likely detrimental effect on public health.
A. Gene Patents as "Toll Booths" on Scientific
Research and Health Care
We first explore gene patents' potential to hinder research efforts,
a concern not wholly unheard of. In fact in 2000, Francis Collins,
then-director of the Human Genome Project, expressed concern that
gene patents may act as "toll booths on basic science." 80 As much of
the advancement of scientific research depends on the free-flowing
sharing and use of information, any restrictions on the use of upstream
research would impede this progress. Instead of sharing their findings
and building off each other's discoveries, patent holders constrain one
another while negotiating licenses or attempting to collect royalties for
76. Greenfield, supra note 68, at 234.
77. Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).
78. Id.
79. Merz, supra note l, at 203.
80. Hill, supra note 21, at 241.
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the use of their inventions. 81 As a result, scientific advancement as a
whole may suffer.
Due to the large volume of patented material in genetics, substan-
tial licensing (and likely a fair amount of cross-licensing) would be
necessary in order to conduct any meaningful research.82 This means
that researchers and physicians will need to negotiate and to pay
royalties83 in order to continue their research efforts and diagnostic
testing. The need for attorneys to negotiate licenses, as well as the li-
censing fees themselves, translates to a substantial expense for re-
searchers and physicians. These heavy tolls may discourage a signifi-
cant number of researchers, unable to afford the additional cost, from
conducting work in a particular area. Although physicians would like-
ly pass on the added expense to patients and insurance companies,
these costs ultimately result in more expensive, and thus more exclu-
sive, health care.
This concern applies to all three of Professor Merz's classes of
gene patents. In the case of clinical care, however, this concern is es-
pecially applicable to diagnostic gene patents, where restrictions on
testing due to diagnostic gene patents may limit the availability of
adequate care to patients and the resources available to physicians.
84
B. Gene Patents as Detriments to Public Health
In addition to the financial harms discussed above, gene patents
impose additional detriments to the public health. The rush to patent
the findings from research in the genetic arts prevents others in the
field from verifying the results of these findings. 85 Due to this rush,
the accuracy of newly patented genetic tests, for example, cannot be
confirmed.86
81, Id.
82. Greenfield, supra note 68, at 234.
83, Professor Merz provides some examples of licensing fees imposed for ge-
netic testing methods, ranging from $2 to over $20 per test. Merz, supra note 1, at
205.
84. Greenfield, supra note 68, at 233. As the potential for gene therapy and
similar treatments increases, functional use gene patents may be of particular con-
cern to physicians as well. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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In extreme cases, a patent holder may even decide not to practice
the invention while simultaneously refusing to allow others to do so,
although there seem to be few reported cases of this. 87 This is not sur-
prising, as the typical rationale for seeking a patent is to obtain money
through licensing fees. Nevertheless, these so-called patent trolls
could have a seriously negative impact on the public health. 88
Although one rarely hears of a gene patent holder's refusing to al-
low any party to practice the invention, highly restrictive licensing is
much more prevalent. In the case of genetic testing for example, some
companies such as Myriad Genetics and Athena Diagnostics have ag-
gressively exercised their rights to exclude, requiring that physicians
and researchers send tissue samples only to approved licensees in or-
der to use the patented testing methods. 89 Additionally, the owner of a
patent for the test for Canavan disease, Miami Children's Hospital,
has licensed this test only to select laboratories. 90 By requiring physi-
cians to send all samples to a limited number of facilities for testing,
the potential for significant delay is a particular concern. Such delays
in obtaining results for genetic tests prevent physicians from diagnos-
ing diseases in their early stages. As timing is often a critical factor for
certain diseases, many conditions that could have been treated earlier
may be too advanced by the time test results are received. These con-
cerns are most relevant to gene patents that cover genetic testing, fall-
ing into Professor Merz's diagnostic gene patent category.
C. Gene Patents as "Hold-Ups" to Research
There is potential for further delay, or even outright halting, of re-
search due to licensing negotiations between patent holders. While
owners of the patent rights haggle back and forth with one another,
87. Merz, supra note 1, at 205.
88. "Patent troll" is the less-than-flattering name often given to patent holders
who attempt to extort money from various businesses using extensive patent portfo-
lios. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 17 (Princeton University
Press 2008). Rather than produce any product themselves, these entities acquire
large numbers of patents and generate capital by seeking out infringers and request-
ing royalties or filing infringement suits. Id. at 17, 159. Such patent holders typically
refer to themselves as "non-practicing entities."
89. Merz, supra note 1, at 205.
90. Id.
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dust grows thick in laboratories as scientists wait for a license to con-
duct their research. 91 Because isolated genes, genetic testing
processes, and purified protein production methods often carry a spe-
cial interdependence with other genes and gene products, any tie-ups
due to failed licensing negotiations are of particular concern for genet-
ics researchers.
92
In addition, the potential profitability of gene patents can cause
researchers to be more hesitant about sharing data and other informa-
tion with others in the scientific community. 93 In an effort to avoid re-
jections under § 102 of the Patent Act-which can bar patentability
even if the inventor himself publicly discloses the invention more than
a year before filing for a patent 94 -researchers may also delay publi-
cation of their findings until filing a patent application. Such secrecy
means less information contributed to the pool of collective know-
ledge from which researchers often base their work. Thus, by delaying
the sharing of new information in the hopes of obtaining a patent, less
knowledge is contributed to the collective, and the overall progress of
research is further hindered.
The concerns about patent trolls are applicable here as well. While
complete bans for licensing patents to researchers are still rare, 95 high-
ly restrictive licensing practices seem to be more common in research
than in health care. Because these restrictions will likely never mean
the difference between life or death, the concern that gene patents hold
up research progress are not as serious as the health care concerns ad-
dressed above. Yet, by restricting the free-flowing use of information,
hold-ups to genetic research certainly do not promote the progress of
useful arts.
91. This topic is discussed at length in Robert Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv.
75, 78-79 (1994).
92. Hill, supra note 21, at 234 ("Since no gene operates in isolation, a single
patentee effectively controls any and all upstream and downstream commercializa-
tion efforts.").
93. Greenfield, supra note 68, at 233.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
95. However, at least one study suggests that gene patents are regularly li-
censed to researchers on exclusive terms. Michelle Henry, et al., A Pilot Survey on
the Licensing of DNA Inventions, 31 J. L.& MED. ETHIcS 442, 444-45 (2003).
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Additionally, any restriction on research has a substantial effect
on progress downstream. By preventing scientists from arriving at (or
sharing) important findings in their field, less information is contri-
buted to the general pool of knowledge. Lacking certain findings on
which to base their research, other scientists may be unable to reach
meaningful conclusions and contribute to the collective. This addi-
tional lack of contribution further compounds the problem, and the
pool slowly runs dry. Certainly such effects are inconsistent with the
Framers' intention that patents promote the progress of useful arts. 96
These concerns likely apply to all three of Professor Merz's classes of
gene patents.
D. Litigious Nature of Gene Patent Holders
Fearful of facing a lawsuit from a litigious patent holder, re-
searchers and (perhaps more importantly) sponsors may not wish to
invest time, funds, or other efforts into a project that may potentially
result in legal action. Because at least some gene patent holders seem
quite willing to assert their patent rights, 97 researchers and physicians
alike may be justified in their fear of potential litigation. Their con-
cerns are furthered by the often high costs of litigation in patent cas-
es.98 This is particularly true in highly complex fields, such as bio-
technology, which often necessitates the hiring of expensive experts to
explain difficult technical concepts to a judge or jury. Parties that can-
not afford such astronomical legal fees (and those that can but are still
scared by the uncertainty often associated with patent litigation) may
often be forced into unfair, one-sided settlement agreements, render-
ing them unable to conduct research on certain subject matter or to di-
agnose certain conditions.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
97. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. (Amgen I1), 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
1737, 1738 (D. Mass. 1990) (case in which patent holder sued a biotechnology com-
pany and its exclusive licensee the same day its patent issued). In this case, the pa-
tent claimed "[a] purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a
DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin." Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,
927 F.2d 1200, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Despite this broad language, on appeal the
court found that the claim was valid and enforceable. Id. at 1219.
98. BESSEN, supra note 88, at 18. In some industries, these litigation costs
even exceed the profits earned from such patents. Id. at 15, 18.
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As described above, a significant amount of evidence points to
gene patents' ability to deter the progress of useful arts and to have an
adverse effect on public health. 99 By discouraging researchers from
contributing to the collective pool of knowledge and limiting their
ability to conduct their work, gene patents act as roadblocks to down-
stream research. Through these and other research hurdles, many gene
patents violate the constitutional authority of Congress to grant exclu-
sive rights solely to encourage innovation. 100
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE GENE PATENT PROBLEM
The constitutional provision that forms the basis for the United
States patent system states a purpose for granting exclusive rights. 10
Gene patents, for the reasons outlined above, often work against that
purpose. 10 2 Accordingly, a solution is necessary. This article now ex-
plores the possibilities available to resolve this issue. As it is both un-
likely and impractical that gene patents will be struck down on a case
by case basis for directly violating the Patent Clause, 10 3 another solu-
tion must be found. While numerous sources have proposed a variety
of legislative and judicial solutions to this issue, none would adequate-
ly resolve this problem, as shown below. 104 Recent case law, however,
99. See supra Part IV.A-C.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress may grant inven-
tors exclusive rights in order to "promote the Progress of ... useful Arts"). Of
course, not all gene patents are categorically a burden to society. Simply claiming a
means for diagnosing a genetic disorder should not be a per se ban on patentability.
A new, novel, and nonobvious instrument for testing for a specific gene, for exam-
ple, would not necessarily violate the Patent Clause. See infra Parts V.A.3., V.B.4.
for further discussion on this point.
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
102. See supra Part IV.
103. One notable author in the history of patent law doubts whether there ex-
ists any sufficiently definite constitutional standard set forth by the Patent Clause
that would serve as a basis for invaliding patents. Walterscheid, supra note 19, at
359. Walterscheid notes that, although the word "discoveries" is used in the Patent
Clause, this term should be interpreted to include only those discoveries falling un-
der the category of "useful Arts." Id. at 360. However, as the Supreme Court has
never defined "useful Arts" as the phrase appears in the Patent Clause, id., it is un-
likely that courts will invalidate individual patents for failing to fall under this cate-
gory.
104. See infra Part V.A.
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offers a new possibility. After reviewing several previously proposed
solutions, this section discusses the potential of a recent en banc Fed-
eral Circuit case to limit gene patents' harm to the progress of useful
arts.
A. Previously Proposed Solutions
A number of solutions have previously been offered as possible
limitations to the harmful impact of gene patents. Several of these are
discussed briefly below.
1. Legislative Solutions
One legislative solution may be to expand the "march-in" rights of
the federal government, originally enacted as part of the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980.105 A little-known and as-of-yet unused provision of the
United States Code allows the federal government to step in and grant
licenses to a party so long as the terms are "reasonable under the cir-
cumstances" and provided certain conditions are met. 10 6 In order to
exercise these march-in rights, the federal government must have
funded (at least partially) the research that gave rise to the patented
invention. 107 A similar provision (or an amendment to the current pro-
vision for march-in rights) may allow the government to grant licenses
to researchers or health care providers for gene patents, even if the pa-
tent holder itself refused to provide such licenses. In addition, it has
also been suggested that a provision to the Patent Statute could be
added to require that holders of gene patents (specifically diagnostic
gene patents) provide licenses to physicians providing medical servic-
es.108 However, because the government's march-in rights under the
Bayh-Dole Act have rarely been used for this purpose, it seems un-
likely that a broad expansion of this authority will occur in the near
future.
105. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-12 (2006).
106. Id. § 203.
107. Id. § 201.
108. Merz, supra note 38, at 324.
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2. Judicial Solutions
As many of the most sweeping changes in patent law have oc-
curred through the courts rather than the legislature, 10 9 perhaps a solu-
tion lies with the courts. Indeed, revised interpretations of the various
statutory requirements for patentability (new, useful, nonobvious, pa-
tentable subject matter with an enabling written description) may act
as a check on gene patents and their detriment on the progress of use-
ful arts. Recall that the Patent Clause itself does not place any specific
restrictions on Congress's ability to grant exclusive rights to inventors
so long as the granting of exclusive rights promotes the progress of
useful arts. 110 However, Congress has chosen to limit the granting of
exclusive rights through various restrictions on patentability.11' The
present Patent Statute, enacted in 1952, requires an invention to be
new, 112 useful, 113 and nonobvious 1 4 eligible subject matter"' in order
to be patentable. In addition, the patent itself must comprise a written
description that has an enabling disclosure." 6 Some suggest that the
key to encouraging innovation, notwithstanding gene patents, lies in
revised case law on one or more of these statutory requirements. 1 7
Yet many of these suggestions fail to adequately address the problem,
109. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980) (allowing
for the patenting of living organisms); Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 339
U.S. 605 (1950) (creating the doctrine of equivalents and expanding what constitutes
infringement); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (creating the
doctrine of patent exhaustion, whereby a patent holder's exclusive rights are ex-
hausted upon the first sale of a patented article); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (allowing for the patent-
ing of so-called business method patents).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
111. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2006) (limiting the granting of a patent to
inventions that are useful, new, and nonobvious).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 101 (providing that a person is entitled to a patent for inventing "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter") (empha-
sis added).
114. Id. § 103.
115. Id. § 101.
116. Id. § 112.
117. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 21, at 232 (suggesting that a revision of current
case law interpreting § 101's utility requirement could limit the harmful effects of
gene patents).
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as case law seems to indicate a reluctance among the courts to steer
the law towards an interpretation necessary to restrict gene patents. 1
8
A sampling of some of these suggestions and a description of their in-
ability to effectively resolve the gene patent problem follows.
i. The Utility Requirement (35 U.S.C. § 101)
One area having potential to limit gene patents' tendency to dis-
courage the progress of useful arts is § 101's utility requirement. His-
torically, the utility requirement's primary function was to prohibit the
patenting of inventions considered, at the time, to be immoral or
against public policy. 119 Today, however, the utility requirement has
become in most cases a nominal bar to patentability, requiring only
that the claimed invention has the ability to function for its intended
purpose.120 As a result, the utility requirement is typically only at issue
in the chemical and biotechnological arts, where the use of a particular
invention may not be readily apparent.
Brenner v. Mason outlines much of the utility standard for the
chemical and biotechnological arts.12 1 There, the Court held that the
claimed chemical compound, which was a homologue for another
compound shown to have tumor-inhibiting effects in mice, had no
stated use or utility apparent to one of skill in the art (other than as a
stepping stone for research endeavors) and was thus unpatentable. 122
However, the Federal Circuit has since seemed to recognize the value
of research and has steered away from this proposition, finding that
the utility requirement of § 101 is satisfied so long as "a properly
claimed invention meets at least one stated objective."' 123
118. See, e.g., Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (classifying the experimental use doctrine, one potential avenue for limiting
gene patents' harmful impacts, as "truly narrow"). But see Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (striking down several claims of a gene
patent for failing to comply with § 112).
119. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
120. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
However, inventions that inherently violate the laws of nature, such as perpetual mo-
tion devices, or that cannot function at all are still unpatentable under this standard.
Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
121. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
122. Id. at 534.
123. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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Still, some have proposed that a clear assertion by the Federal
Circuit (or the Supreme Court) of the unpatentability of a chemical
compound having no use other than as a stepping stone for research
would alleviate many of the concerns associated with gene patents. 124
However, this solution does not adequately address the full problem.
Even if a court were to issue such a ruling, clever claim drafters may
still be able to circumvent such a holding by disclosing that the inven-
tion's utility lies in areas other than research, such as for diagnostic
testing purposes. In addition, this limitation would not serve as a
check at all on diagnostic gene patents, such as genetic test kits or
cDNA used in gene therapy, as these patents clearly have utility other
than use as a stepping stone to research.
ii. The Enablement Requirement (35 U.S.C. § 112)
Another potential avenue for limiting gene patents may lie in §
112's enablement requirement.125 In the Amgen case, the Federal Cir-
cuit used this provision to invalidate a patent that claimed a DNA se-
quence consisting of amino acid sequences duplicative of EPO. 126 The
court held that the generic claim directed to an isolated DNA sequence
was not enabled when the claim read on about 4,000 nucleotides but
only disclosed how to make a few examples. 127 Because "the scope of
enablement [must be] as broad as the scope of the claim," the overly
broad claim at issue in Amgen violated the enablement requirement.128
The enablement requirement ensures that claims will be construed on-
ly as broadly as the examples and descriptions in the patent's written
specification. Thus the enablement requirement may limit the scope of
claims in gene patents.
124. Hill, supra note 21, at 232.
125. Recall that this section of the Patent Act requires all applications to de-
scribe the claimed invention in a way that allows one of ordinary skill in the field to
make and use it. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2006).
126. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
127. Id. (stating that claims to genetic sequences will be valid if "they are of a
scope appropriate to the invention disclosed by the applicant").
128. Id. at 1212; see also In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 836, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 "requires that the scope of the claims must bear a rea-
sonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to per-
sons of ordinary skill in the art").
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A limitation of scope, however, is not as effective as a total bar to
patentability. Under Amgen, as long as the patent's description of the
genes or methods it intends to cover reasonably correlates to the scope
of the claims, the enablement requirement will be satisfied.1 29 An ap-
plicant for a patent could easily list this subject matter, turning gene
patents into voluminous copies of reference manuals and known data-
bases. Thus, while the enablement requirement could potentially limit
the scope of gene patents, it would only minimally diminish the harm
caused by them.
Furthermore, this course of action would leave most diagnostic
gene patents relatively untouched, as the claimed methods would like-
ly be described in detail in the patent's specification. Even relatively
broad method claims, such as those of the '167 patent,130 would likely
not be construed as unduly broad in light of the numerous examples a
patentee would likely describe in the specification. Accordingly, this
proposal is also inadequate.
iii. The Experimental Use Doctrine
In addition to the attacks on patentability, some authors have pro-
posed limiting the scope of issued patents. 3 1 One such limitation may
lie in an exception to infringement known as the experimental use
doctrine. The experimental use doctrine-a distant, albeit watered-
down, cousin of the fair use doctrine in copyright law-allows for the
use of patented inventions "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry."' 132 The experimental use doctrine,
however, is extremely limited.13 3 Arguably, an expansion of this doc-
129. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1214.
130. U.S. Patent No. 5,508,167, at claim 1 (filed Apr. 13, 1994).
131. Merz, supra note 1, at 206.
132. Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
133. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor
for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's
legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strict-
ly limited experimental use defense. [T]he profit or non-profit status of the user is
not determinative.").
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trine to publicly and privately funded research would prevent the neg-
ative downstream impact of patenting genetic material. 134
However, because of this doctrine's extremely limited application,
even use for research or diagnostic purposes is likely to fall outside of
this narrow exception. Thus, a broad expansion of the experimental
use doctrine would be required. In fact, in 2002, a bill that would have
exempted use of genetic sequences for purposes of research was sub-
mitted to a House subcommittee.1 35 However, no further action has
been taken since its submission. In addition, courts have been quite
apprehensive to apply this doctrine. 136 Due to the longstanding nature
of this narrow common law exception,' 37 it is unlikely that the broad
expansion necessary to curb the harm of gene patents will occur.
iv. The Nonobviousness Requirement (35 U.S.C. § 103)
Another statutory requirement for patentability is the nonobvious
requirement of § 103.138 This provision states that an applicant is not
entitled to a patent "if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person of ordinary skill in the art."' 139 This requirement at-
tempts to bar patentability for inventions that, although not explicitly
disclosed in any one source, amount to only minor modifications or
combinations of already known subject matter. 140
Due to advances in the understanding of genetics, it is now fairly
routine and easy to determine the function of particular genes. 141 In
134. See Merz, supra note 1, at 207 ("[R]esearch on the invention should be
exempt while research using the invention [should be deemed] infringement.").
135. See The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002,
H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
136. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1360 ("Our precedent.., continues to recognize
the judicially created experimental use defense, however, in a very limited form.").
137. The experimental use exception has its origins in early-1800s case law.
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120,1121 (D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Andrews, supra note 43, at 803 ("[T]he function of human genes can now
be predicted on the basis of their homology to other genes.").
164 [Vol. 46
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addition, the processes for isolating human genes and for determining
which genes encode for specific proteins are relatively well-known
and documented. 142 For these reasons, some feel that the nonobvious-
ness requirement can limit gene patents. 143 In particular, this solution
seems very likely to limit composition-of-matter (and certain func-
tional-use) gene patents in the future.
Nevertheless, this avenue is unlikely to have an impact on diag-
nostic gene patents. In a series of cases in the early- to mid-nineties,
the Federal Circuit addressed the obviousness requirement as applied
to methods in the biotechnological arts. 144 In these cases, the court de-
finitively stated that a general method for DNA isolation will not, on
its own, render a DNA sequence obvious. 145 This reluctance of the
court to find diagnostic gene patents obvious despite their roots in
known, non-novel methods makes the nonobviousness requirement an
unlikely solution to limiting diagnostic gene patents.
3. Separating the Good from the Bad
An additional fault with each of the solutions presented above is
that none adequately separates the chaff from the wheat. An ideal pa-
tent system should grant patents for inventions that make meaningful
(i.e. new, useful, and nonobvious) contributions to society in order to
encourage the progress of useful arts. Simultaneously, an ideal system
should preclude from patent eligibility those inventions that do not
contribute meaningfully and thus fail to promote progress. Because
there may be some patents related to the field of genetics that do not
violate the Patent Clause, it is important to distinguish those that do
from those that do not.
These concerns are particularly present for diagnostic gene pa-
tents. Here, more than in Professor Merz's other categories, there ex-
ists potential for meaningful contribution. In the case of composition-
of-matter gene patents, for example, claims directed to genes them-
142. Jeffrey Dillen, Comment, DNA Patentability-Anything But Obvious,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 1023, 1030 (1997).
143. Id. at 1029-30.
144. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d
781, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1993); and Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200,
1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
145. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559; Dillen, supra note 142, at 1036.
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selves add little or no beneficial knowledge to society, as these patents
merely claim specific portions of the genome rather than a new, use-
ful, and nonobvious innovation.1 46 And because these patents have the
potential to be so damaging, there is little need for concern with sepa-
rating so-called good composition-of-matter gene patents from so-
called bad composition-of-matter gene patents.
While the case for weeding out the bad in functional-use gene pa-
tents is stronger than for composition-of-matter gene patents, it is still
not as great a concern as that for diagnostic gene patents. Because the
benefits of many functional-use gene patents (essentially claiming
structures that mimic the functionality of certain genes) is limited at
this point, the separation of good from bad is not a significant concern.
Contrary to other types of gene patents, an incredible break-
through in genetics testing (falling under the diagnostic gene patent
category) is just the sort of invention that the patent system should
seek to protect. Therefore, an adequate solution to the gene patent
problem should be able to separate the good from the bad.
B. A New Potential for Limiting Diagnostic Gene Patents:
In re Bilski and Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
While the nonobvious requirement may effectively keep composi-
tion-of-matter and functional-use patents in check, a new means to
limit diagnostic gene patents is necessary. As described above, diag-
nostic gene patents work against the constitutional mandate by acting
as hold-ups to scientific research, as detriments to public healthcare,
and as tolls that increase the cost of research and healthcare. For these
reasons, diagnostic gene patents are, at present, the most troubling of
Professor Merz's three categories.
A recent en banc Federal Circuit decision, In re Bilski,147 howev-
er, may hold a key to restricting the patentability of harmful diagnostic
gene patents through the eligible subject matter requirement of § 101
of the Patent Statute. Although the primary impact of the Bilski deci-
sion will likely be felt in the areas of business method patents and oth-
er, software-based process claims, this notable decision may also pro-
146. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008, at claim 2 (filed Nov. 30, 1984)
(claiming merely a "purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a
DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin").
147. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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vide a potential avenue for keeping diagnostic gene patents in check.
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit clarified the standard for assessing
whether certain process claims constitute patent-eligible subject mat-
ter under § 101.148 However, before turning to this decision (and its
potential effect on gene patents), the reader may find helpful a brief
review of the controlling law on patent-eligible subject matter as ap-
plied to the biotechnological arts.
1. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter (35 U.S.C. § 101)
Under § 101 of the Patent Statute, an applicant is entitled to a pa-
tent for any new and useful "process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter."'149 These four groups represent the four categories
of patent-eligible subject matter. In order to be eligible for a patent,
the subject matter of the invention must fall within at least one of
these categories. 15
0
Originally, living things were considered to be outside the scope
of patent-eligible subject matter, as they were viewed not as inven-
tions but as products of nature. 151 However, under Chakrabarty, prod-
ucts of nature in a purified form constitute patent-eligible subject mat-
ter, as they are still compositions of matter.1 52 Thus, biological
material, including isolated or purified genes, constitutes patent-
eligible subject matter. 153
148. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. Section 101 states that "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" may be patented, subject
to the other provisions of the patent statute. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). For this reason,
the patent-eligible subject matter requirement is often considered a "threshold" re-
quirement. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
149. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
150. However, the invention need not fall squarely within just one of the cate-
gories, and it is not necessary to specify precisely which category an invention falls
under in order to be eligible for patentability. E.g., M.P.E.P., supra note 51, §
2173.05(p).
151. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of na-
ture, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are
not patentable, as they are basic tools of scientific and technological work."); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("Patents cannot
issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature .... They are manifestations of
laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.").
152. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
153. See id.
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2. The Bilski Decision
The recently decided Bilski decision marks a notable change in the
court's interpretation of patent-eligible subject matter as applied to
process patents and may even partially limit the broad eligibility inter-
pretations rooted in Chakrabarty.154 Claim 1 of Bilski's application
recites:
A method for managing the consumption of risk costs of a com-
modity[,] comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between [a] commodity
provider and consumers of said commodity.. .;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity...;
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and said market participants ... such that said series of
market participant transactions balances the risk position of said se-
ries of consumer transactions. 155
The Bilski court attempted to redefine the standard for determin-
ing whether a claimed method constituted a patent-eligible "process"
under § 101 of the Patent Statute. 156 In so doing, the case made the
"machine-or-transformation" test the new standard for making this de-
termination.15 7 Thus, under Bilski, a claim contains patent-eligible
subject matter if "(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing."'158
The machine-or-transformation test apparently arises from a desire to
prevent the patenting (or "preemption") of "fundamental principles,"
such as abstract ideas, laws of nature, or other traditionally-ineligible
subject matter.' 59 In Bilski, the court (after first noting that the claimed
154. The Bilski decision holds that a process claim will satisfy § 101 eligibility
by showing that the claimed process either is tied to a machine or transforms an ar-
ticle, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008), while Chakrabarty holds that
"everything under the sun made by man" is patentable, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at
309.
155. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 966.
158. Id. at 954.
159. See id. at 963 ("So long as the claimed process is limited to a practical
application of a fundamental principle to transform specific data, and the claim is
168 [Vol. 46
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process was not tied to any specific machine or apparatus) concluded
that the process above did not transform any article to a different state
or thing, thus failing the machine-or-transformation test.16
0
Although the court elected to "leave to future cases" elaboration
on the machine prong of the test, it did provide an analysis of what
does and does not satisfy the transformation prong. 161 Here, the court
held that a process would satisfy this prong (and thus constitute eligi-
ble subject matter) if it transformed "an article into a different state or
thing."' 162 The court further held that "[t]his transformation must be
central to the purpose of the claimed process."' 163 The court then con-
sidered the question of what sorts of things constituted "articles," and
concluded that mere abstract concepts or other traditionally-
unpatentable subject matter did not constitute an article for these pur-
poses. 164 In this way, the machine-or-transformation test could serve
to prevent patentees from claiming all, or an overly-broad range of,
uses of a fundamental principle.' 65 The fundamental principle claimed
in Bilski was the use of abstract ideas and mental processes to calcu-
late the hedging of risks between commodities and market partici-
pants. 166 Quoting an earlier case, the court concluded that a claim that
requires an "application of [only] human intelligence to the solution of
practical problems" is merely a claim to a fundamental principle, and
thus unpatentable. 167 Although the court focused on the claimed
process's lack of transformation of a physical object or substance in
rejecting the claims in Bilski, 168 the application of this principle seems
clear: process claims that involve the use of fundamental principles
(whether abstract concepts, physical phenomena, or other traditionally
limited to a visual depiction that represents specific physical objects or substances,
there is no danger that the scope of the claim would wholly pre-empt all uses of the
principle.").
160. Id.
161. Id. at 962.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 956.
166. Id. at 949-50.
167. Id. at 965 (quoting In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
168. Id. at 963-64.
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ineligible subject matter) do not constitute a "process" under § 101
unless the claims are tied to some physical apparatus or are capable of
a transformation that is central to the purpose of the process.1 6 9
3. Limitations on Gene Patents Through Bilski
In gene patents, the fundamental principle is not an abstract idea
or a mental process as in Bilski, but rather naturally occurring compo-
sitions of matter: genes. The concern, however, remains the same in
either case: namely, the use of otherwise unpatentable subject matter
as the foundation for a patent.
For example, in the case of the '167 patent, any laboratory can
easily test for the APOE gene (without using any patented device or
product) simply by knowing the sequence of the APOE gene. 170 Claim
1 of the '167 patent, like the claims of many diagnostic gene patents,
essentially recites two basic steps: (1) comparing a discovered gene to
a sample of a subject's DNA, and (2) determining whether a particular
condition exists based on the presence or absence of the gene in the
sample. 17' Such a claim contains no transformative step and would
169. For example, the Bilski court cites to a case in which the Federal Circuit's
predecessor court held that a broad independent claim reciting the process of dis-
playing variances of data from average values constituted ineligible subject matter.
Id. at 962-63 (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). However, the
court held that a narrower, dependent claim was eligible when it recited "said data is
X-ray attenuation data produced in a two dimensional field by a computed tomogra-
phy scanner." Id. at 962 (citing Abele, 684 F.2d at 908-09). The court found this
"transformation of ... raw data into a particular visual depiction of a physical object
on a display unit" to be a patent-eligible process. Id. at 963. Although this language
seems to suggest that a display of data would satisfy the transformation prong of the
Bilski standard, this is not the case. The process in Abele translated data that
represented information on the physical structures of bones, organs, and other tissue
into a physical depiction of those organs on a display. Abele, 684 F.2d at 908. Thus,
diagnostic gene patents will not pass the machine-or-transformation test simply by
claiming the display of genes on a smear.
170. Andrews, supra note 43, at 804.
171. U.S. Patent No. 5,508,167, at claim 1 (filed Apr. 13, 1994). At least three
Justices of the Supreme Court seemed to express that such processes are undeserv-
ing of patent protection, and, in a dissent to a dismissal of a writ of certiorari, Justice
Breyer stated that a similar claim constituted unpatentable subject matter. Lab. Corp.
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 135-36 (2006) (5-3 deci-
sion) (Breyer, J., dissenting). One of the claims at issue in Lab. Corp. recited a
process comprising the steps of "[(1)] assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of
170 [Vol. 46
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almost certainly fail the machine-or-transformation test, thus placing
the method outside the scope of eligible subject matter. As in Bilski,
diagnostic gene patents "seek to claim a non-transformative process
that encompasses [a fundamental principle] without the aid of ... any
other device."1 72 Such claims would preempt all uses of the "funda-
mental concept" of diagnosing a particular genetic condition, regard-
less of the specific methodology or equipment used. This preemption
is precisely the type of claim that the machine-or-transformation test
attempts to exclude from eligibility. 1
73
The claims of the '167 patent, much like the claims in many diag-
nostic gene patents, are not tied to any specific machine or appara-
tus. 174 Thus, as in Bilski, the patentability of such claims rests solely
on their ability to satisfy the transformation prong of the machine-or-
transformation test.
The process recited by claim 1 of the '167 patent is not transfor-
mative either.' 75 Typical of many diagnostic gene patents, this claim
simply involves comparing a particular gene or group of genes with a
sample of DNA to determine the presence or absence of the gene or
genes. 176 The claim recites no physical or chemical alteration; nor
does it refer to anything changing, reforming, or otherwise becoming
another thing. 
177
One may argue that applicants could draft otherwise unpatentable
process claims to include ties to machines or apparatuses in order to
overcome the machine-or-transformation test. However, even if appli-
cants began doing so, this practice itself would help to solve many of
the problems of diagnostic gene patents. Because tying the process to
a specific tool or group of tools requires that those exact tools be used
total homocysteine; and [(2)] correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in
said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate." Id. at 129; U.S. Patent No.
4,940,658 claim 13 (filed Nov. 20, 1986).
172. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 965.
173. Id. at 961. Such overbroad claims have historically been excluded from
patent protection. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853) (holding that a
claim reading on all uses of electromagnetic waves for printing characters over a
distance was ineligible).
174. '167 Patent at claim 1.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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in order to infringe, the scope of the claim is drastically limited.'78 In
addition, although Bilski leaves an elaboration of the machine prong
of the test to future cases, it seems likely that a future court will re-
quire that the claimed machine or apparatus, like the transformation
prong, 179 be central to the claimed process. In this way, the mere in-
clusion of "known tools in a way known to those of skill in the art"
would not overcome the Bilski standard, as this inclusion is not central
to the claimed process.180 Thus, many of these harmful, overbroad
processes would still be open to rejection under the machine-or-
transformation test.
4. Separating the Chafffrom the Wheat
Applying the machine-or-transformation test to diagnostic gene
patents would have the additional benefit of blocking harmful diag-
nostic gene patents while simultaneously allowing claims directed to
truly innovative methods. For example, an application containing
claims that recite the use of a novel machine or apparatus would likely
satisfy the as-of-yet undefined machine prong of the Bilski test. In a
less clear-cut case, this test would still separate the bad from the good.
Consider, for example, U.S. Patent No. 5,272,055 (the '055 patent),
which claims methods for detection of Alzheimer's disease and other
diseases using a photoaffinity. 18 1 Claim 1 of the '055 patent recites:
A method for aiding in the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease in a
mammal comprising:
178. In addition, the tying of a method to a specific component may render the
claims vulnerable to rejection under the novel and nonobvious requirements of §§
102 and 103 of the Patent Statute, as many of these tools are well-known to those of
skill in the art. Those processes that do contain new tools or machinery would likely
pass this standard, thus ensuring that truly novel innovations receive patent protec-
tion, as intended by the Framers. Infra Part II.A.
179. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the
"transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed process").
180. By "central," it is meant the true inventive or novel aspect of the process.
Id. This aspect of the machine-or-transformation test ensures that the nominal addi-
tion of known transformations (or components) in known ways does not allow
claims to circumvent the test. Id.
181. U.S. Patent No. 5,272,055, at [54] (filed Dec. 24, 1991). Although not a
gene patent, the methods of the '055 Patent provide a helpful illustration. Id.
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a) contacting a cerebrospinal fluid sample which contains a
nucleotide binding protein having an apparent Mr of about 42,000
daltons, wherein said protein is glutamine synthetase, with an effec-
tive amount of a labeled ATP- or GTP-analog photoaffinity-
labeling reagent which specifically binds said nucleotide binding
protein at the nucleotide binding site to photoaffinity label said nuc-
leotide protein;
b) fractionating said cerebrospinal fluid sample to separate the
photoaffinity-labeled nucleotide binding protein;
c) detecting the presence of the separated photoaffinity-labeled
nucleotide binding protein; and
d) correlating the presence of the photoaffinity-labeled nucleo-
tide binding protein to the presence of Alzheimer's disease.
182
Here, unlike many diagnostic gene patents, the method does not
attempt to preempt all uses of fundamental principle. The method re-
cited by claim 1 of the '055 patent does not simply claim the process
of comparing and determining (as in the '167 patent) but instead re-
cites specific steps for setting up this comparison.' 83Accordingly, the
'055 patent and similar patents do not carry the concerns raised by
many diagnostic gene patents. For example, in order to infringe claim
1 of the '055 patent, a specific binding protein and photoaffinity-
labeling reagent would need to be used. 184 A party seeking to avoid
infringement need only find a substitute for either of these compo-
nents. Thus, a researcher or physician attempting to test for Alzhei-
mer's disease could circumvent this patent by using other methods
that do not utilize glutamine synthetase. In reciting the use of a nuc-
leotide binding protein and a photoaffinity-labeling reagent, the claim
may satisfy the machine prong of the Bilski test.185 However, even if
this prong were not satisfied, it is likely that the claim would still pass
under the transformation prong, as the "contacting" step (or even the
182. Id. at claim 1.
183. Id.
184. See id. (claiming "a cerebrospinal fluid sample which contains a nucleo-
tide binding protein having an apparent Mr of about 42,000 daltons, wherein said
protein is glutamine synthetase").
185. Id.
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"fractioning" step) could be considered as changing the sample "into a
different state or thing." 18
6
In either case, because the holding of Bilski stems from a deeply
rooted desire to bar patents that preempt all uses of a fundamental
principle' 87 and because the '055 patent and others like it merely
claim one use of a fundamental principle, gene patents similar to the
'055 patent and deserving of patent protection would likely pass the
machine-or-transformation test. In this way, the machine-or-
transformation test ensures that diagnostic gene patents that actually
do foster the progress of useful arts remain patent-eligible subject mat-
ter, while those diagnostic gene patents that hinder this progress are
excluded from patent protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
In drafting the Patent Clause of the Constitution, the Framers-
both well aware and fearful of the potentially devastating effects of
monopolies on society-were careful to include an important limita-
tion to the power to grant exclusive rights: that such a grant encourage
the progress of useful arts.188 In acting in accordance with this consti-
tutional mandate, the United States patent system should make every
effort to ensure that patents issue for inventions that serve this goal.
However, gene patents represent a group of patents that generally
hinder innovation and therefore act contrary to the Patent Clause. In
particular, diagnostic gene patents place an especially heavy burden
on society, as they act as a substantial detriment to public healthcare
while doing little to encourage the progress of useful arts. While many
solutions have been proposed to deal with the gene patent problem,
none adequately resolve the particular harmfulness of diagnostic gene
patents.
However, the Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski has the potential
to severely limit the harmful effects of diagnostic gene patents through
186. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Note also that the "trans-
formation" by combining the sample with the photoaffinity-labeling reagent appears
to be a central part of the process. See '055 Patent at col. 15 11.3-11.
187. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957 ("pre-emption is merely an indication that a
claim seeks to cover a fundamental principle itself rather than only a specific appli-
cation of that principle").
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the court's restatement of the machine-or-transformation test.189 Under
Bilski, patent claims directed to processes that are not tied to some
machine or that do not involve a transformation that is central to the
claimed process fail this test. 190 Because such processes serve to claim
a fundamental principle itself, rather than a use of a fundamental prin-
ciple, these processes are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
Many harmful diagnostic gene patents, which are typically not tied to
any specific article or piece of equipment and which typically involve
no meaningful transformation that is central to the purpose of the
claimed process, would likely fail this test. As a result, the clear inten-
tions of the Framers are preserved, and the patent system may more
effectively serve its goal: to promote the progress of useful arts.
189. As of this writing, at least one Federal Circuit case seems to support this
proposition. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, No. 2006-1634,
slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008). Although non-precedential, the single-
paragraph opinion in Classen invalidated, under Bilski's machine-or-transformation
test, a patent similar to a diagnostic gene patent. Id. Claim 1 of this patent reads:
A method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects the
incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder in a treat-
ment group of mammals, relative to a control group of mammals, which
comprises:
immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with one or
more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization
schedule, and
comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic
immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in
the treatment group, with that in the control group.
U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283, at claim 1 (filed May 31, 1995).
This method essentially discloses nothing more than (1) the inserting of one or more
doses of immunogens into an animal, and (2) the comparing of the results to a con-
trol group. Thus, the framework of this method bears a strong similar to many diag-
nostic gene patents.
190. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
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